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S.: Pleading--Equity--Insufficiency of Bill a Jurisdictional Defect
CASE COMMENTS
PLEADING-EQUITY-INSUFFICENCY

OF

BILL

A

JURISDICTIONAL

DEFcT.-Suit to set aside as void, for lack of jurisdiction over the

parties, a divorce decree granted D, the husband, in the same court
two years before. On demurrer, the court restricted hearing to
the question of whether the wife had made or authorized a general
appearance. After such hearing the court decided that she had
authorized a general appearance by counsel; whereupon her bill
was dismissed. P appealed. Held, after agreeing with the lower
court that the wife had made a general appearance, that nonetheless, since the bill for divorce did not contain a sufficient statement
of grounds for divorce, the court was without jurisdiction of the
subject matter and therefore the divorce decree was void. The
earlier decree was adjudged void so far as it granted a divorce;
decree dismissing instant proceeding reversed; cause remanded.
Bennett v. Bennett, 70 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1952), rehearing denied,
September 23, 1952.
The proposition which our court seems to have propounded
is essentially this: mere insufficiency in a bill of complaint, that is,
an insufficient statement of the grounds for divorce, is a jurisdictional defect giving the court the right to examine the matter on
its own motion in a collateral proceeding; which in turn, of course,
gives it the right to declare a decree based on such a bill void. To
quote the actual holding of the court: ". . . the facts alleged as constituting cruel and inhuman treatment are insufficient to constitute
any charge entitling the husband to a divorce, and ... the court was,
therefore, without jurisdiction to enter a divorce decree."
What power does the court have to enter a decree in a certain
cause? First, the court must have jurisdiction over the parties, to
be gained by proper notice or consent; second, and most important
for the purpose of this comment, the court must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Inquiry should be made into what our
court has meant when it has spoken heretofore concerning jurisdiction over the subject matter. In Anderson v. Anderson, 121 W. Va.
103, 1 S.E.2d 884 (1939), the court states that "there can be no
question of the ... circuit court's jurisdiction of the subject matter,
because, in this state, a circuit court's jurisdiction of divorce suits
is conferred by statute." See W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 2, § 6 (Michie,
1949). Speaking generally on the question, our court in Haymond
v. Camden, 22 W. Va. 180 (1883), said that jurisdiction over subject
matter is "conferred by the Constitution and laws of the State or

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1953

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [1953], Art. 11
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
country in which the courts are situate, and consists of the power
to hear a particularclass of cases, or to determine controversies of
a specified character." (Italics supplied). Amplifying on the matter further, a court in another state said that jurisdiction over
subject matter "does not mean jurisdiction of the particular case,
which must be acquired by some method of bringing the case
before the court for adjudication." Roy v. Upton, 234 Ill. App. 53
(1924).
There are various methods of bringing a particular suit before
any certain court. The question of jurisdiction is sometimes
governed by the place where the act complained of occurred,
Becket v. Becket, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 370 (1856); Williams v.
Williams, 3 R.I. 185 (1855); sometimes by the matrimonial domicil,
and sometimes by the domicil of the parties, or both of them. Hood
v. State, 56 Ind. 268 (1877); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 45 Me. 377
(1858); Watkins v. Watkins, 135 Mass. 83 (1883). But whatever
the method, it is obvious that such jurisdictional facts must be
recited in the bill. HOGG, Equrry PLEADING § 575 (Miller's ed.
1943). That some courts have held this requirement to be part
of the true concept of jurisdiction over subject matter is readily
seen from this excerpt: "[T]he existence of one of the facts mentioned in the statute [requiring either an allegation of residence
within the state for one year prior to petition or that acts complained of were committed within the state] is an indispensable
element constitutive of the right to maintain an action for divorce
and .. . without it the whole proceeding is coram non judice for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter." Stansbury v. Stansbury, 118 Mo. App. 427, 94 S.W. 566 (1906).
In keeping with the idea that jurisdictional facts must be
recited, our legislature has provided: (1) the venue statute which
geographically limits the general jurisdiction of circuit courts to
grant divorces, W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 2, § 9 (Michie, 1949); (2)
the statute requiring that the divorce bill show that the plaintiff
had been an actual bona fide resident of the state for at least one
year prior to the bringing of the suit, W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 2, §.8
(Michie, 1949); and (3) the statute specifying certain exclusive
grounds for which a divorce will be granted, W. VA. CODE c. 48, art.
2, § 4 (Michie, 1949). The court nowhere in its opinion doubts
that the requirements of the first and second statutes have been
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met, and therefore it must be determined whether the bill complied
with the third statute.
Admitted that a decree should be read in the light of the
pleadings, and, so far as it purports to grant relief without foundation therefor in the pleadings, it is void, Cato v. Silting, 73 S.E.2d
731 (W. Va. 1952); HOGG, EQUITY PLEADING § 576 (Miller's ed.
1943), it is difficult to see how the court determined that this bill
was completely devoid of "any charge entitling the husband to a
divorce." As stated by the court, the bill alleged that the wife
admitted not only only kissing a certain man but that she may
have had "improper" relations with that man; further, that she
constantly nagged him, that she had no love for him, and did not
desire to live with him any longer. In concluding, the bill alleged
that the wife had been extremely cruel and had caused the plaintiff
to suffer much strain and worry causing his health and peace of
mind to be seriously affected.
Was the husband grounding his prayer for divorce on desertion?
Or that the wife was an habitual drunkard or addicted to morphine? Or that she was a convicted felon? The questions are
rhetorical.
The proper test seems to be whether it can be determined
from the pleadings, either directly or indirectly, on what ground the
party is seeking relief. Even immaterial and wholly insufficient
allegations may be enough to set the judicial mind in motion.
"Judgments and decrees are not collaterally assailable as void for
want of jurisdiction in the court to enter them, merely because the
pleadings on which they rest lack material averments." Jarrell
v. Laurel Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 752, 84 S.E. 933 (1915); Noder v.
Alexander, 114 W. Va. 563, 172 S.E. 613 (1934); 1 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 269 (2d ed. 1902). If, in a case in which it is questionable whether a court has jurisdiction, it erroneously decides
that it does, its decree is only voidable and not open to collateral
attack. St. Lawrence Co. v. Holt & Mathews, 51 W. Va. 352, 41 S.E.
351 (1902).
In the many cases cited and discussed by the court, only its
quotation from 27 C.J.S., Divorce § 108 (1941) would seem to support its position. But, C.J.S. cites only Jones v. Jones, 8 W. W. Harr.
162, 189 Atl. 588 (1937) which was a controversy on direct appeal
to an intermediate court in Delaware. There the court held that
because the ground for divorce stated was not recognized by the

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1953

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [1953], Art. 11
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

Delaware statutes, no cause of action was alleged.
(The bill
alleged desertion, whereas the statutory ground was "wilful" desertion.)
The only apparent justification for the court's holding is that
henceforth it shall require a greater degree of particularity-a closer
adherence to the rules of pleading-in bills of complaint for divorce.
So restricted, the court's pronouncement would not appear so
startling. Indeed, the opinion states that due to the interest of
the state in the protection and preservation of the marriage relationship, accurate pleading should be demanded before the marriage is dissolved. Undoubtedly, it is a wise policy which enjoins
the courts with the duty of watching over divorce proceedings with
the closest surveillance. A policy which interposes to prevent
abuses of the delicate and reasonable power confided in the courts
to dissolve the marriage contract is certainly desirable. But, aside
from the statutory protection of the state's interest under W. VA.
CODE c. 48, art. 2, § 24 (Michie, 1949) which provides for appointment of a commissioner to investigate and "defend the interests of
the State," other interests are here involved. Holding, as the court
does, that divorce decrees which do not have a sufficient averment
of grounds to support them are forever open to attack, what of the
security of land titles passed pursuant to divorce decrees? Or the
poor abstractor struggling with the record of a divorce granted,
to be certain (or never be certain?) that the title he certifies is
secure? Or think for a minute of the fate of Mr. Williams and
his second wife, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942),
325 U.S. 226 (1945), and of such a possibility under this decision.
W. 0. S.

TAXATION-APPLICATION FOR REFUND.-Petition for writ of
mandamus requiring D to issue a warrant on the State Treasurer
to refund a tax payment as recommended by the Court of Claims
and approved by the legislature which requested that the amount
in controversy be paid as a moral obligation against the State
under W. VA. CODE C. 11, art. 13, § 3 (Michie, 1949). Held, that
inasmuch as the remedy under W. VA. CODE c. 11, art. 1,§ 2a was
not complete, writ awarded. Raleigh County Bank v. Sims, 73
S.E.2d 526 (W. Va. 1952).
The pertinent part of W. VA. CODE c. 11, art. 1, § 2a (Michie
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